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E-book

Wittgenstein's account of truth

Summary: Annotation Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use, " what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

Record details

ISBN: 9780791487365
ISBN: 0791487369
ISBN: 9780791456262
ISBN: 0791456269
ISBN: 9780791456255
ISBN: 0791456250
ISBN: 9781417519330
ISBN: 1417519339
Physical Description: 1 online resource (xv, 148 pages)
remote
Publisher: Albany : State University of New York Press, ©2003.

Content descriptions

Bibliography, etc. Note:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 137-144) and index.
Formatted Contents Note:	Machine generated contents note: pt. I From "Meaning Is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- pt. II From "Meaning Is Use" To Semantic Antirealism -- 4. Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- pt. III Why A Revisionist Account Of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth?
Restrictions on Access Note:	NLC staff and students only.
Language Note:	English.
Source of Description Note:	Print version record.